We discuss secure computation of modular sum when multiple access channel from distinct players A 1 , . . . , A c to a third party (Receiver) is given. Then, we define the secure modulo sum capacity as the supremum of the transmission rate of modulo sum without information leakage of other information. We derive its useful lower bound, which is numerically calculated under a realistic model that can be realizable as a Gaussian multiple access channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, secure multiparty computation has been actively studied even from the information theoretical viewpoint. One of its simple examples is secure computation of modular sum [1] , [2] . This problem has been often discussed from the Shannon-theoretic viewpoint [3] , [4] . If we assume secure communication channels between a part of players, secure computation of modular sum is possible. Secure communication channels consumes cryptographic resources. In this paper, instead of such resources, we focus on multiple access channel (MAC), which has been actively studied for a long time [5] , [6] , [7] . That is, we study how to realize secure computation via MAC instead of conventional secure communication channels. As a typical example, we investigate secure computation of modular sum when a MAC from distinct players A 1 , . . . , A c to a third party (Receiver) is given. That is, each player A i sends a sequence of their secure random number M i = (M i,1 , . . . , M i,k ) ∈ F k q that is subject to the uniform distribution, and Receiver recovers only the modulo sums ( Fig. 1 . Here, to keep the secrecy, it is required that Receiver cannot obtain any information except for the modulo sums. In this way, we can compute the modulo sums. As a simple case [8] , [9] , we may consider the channel where the output signal Y of the channel is given as
with the i-th input variables X i and the noise variable N , where ⊕ is the modulo sum. When all senders encode their message by using the same linear code, the receiver cannot obtain any information with respect to each sender's message because each message is subject to the uniform distribution. Hence, the code is decodable under the noise N , the receiver can recover the modulo sums (
where E is a constant and N is the Gaussian variable with average 0 and variance v. In this case, a part of information for the message of each sender might be leaked to the receiver. To cover multiple Gaussian channels, this paper addresses a general MAC. If the secrecy condition is not imposed and the channel is a multiple Gaussian channel, this problem is a simple example of computation-and-forward [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] . Due to the secrecy condition, we cannot realize this task by their simple application. In the case of c = 2, since the modulo sums give the information of the other player, the protocol enables the two players to exchange their messages without information leakage to Masahito Hayashi is with Graduate School of Mathematics, Nagoya University, Nagoya, Japan, Shenzhen Institute for Quantum Science and Engineering, Southern University of Science and Technology, China, and Centre for Quantum Technologies, National University of Singapore, Singapore. e-mail: masahito@math.nagoya-u.ac.jp Receiver [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] when Receiver broadcasts the modulo sum to both players. Application of such a protocol is discussed in several network models [25] . Our protocol can be regarded as an multi-player extension with a generic setting of the protocol given in [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] .
Further, when we can realize secure transmission of modulo sum with k transmitter, multiplying −1 to the receiver's variable, we can realize secure modulo zero-sum randomness among k + 1 players, that is the k + 1 random variables with zero-sum condition and certain security conditions [24, Section 2] . As is explained in [24] , secure modulo zero-sum randomness can be regarded as a cryptographic resource for several cryptographic tasks including secure multi-party computation of homomorphic functions, secret sharing without secure communication channel, and a cryptographic task, multi-party anonymous authentication. In this sense, secure transmission of modulo sum is needed in the viewpoint of cryptography.
In this paper, we formulate the secure modulo sum capacity as the maximum of the secure transmission of modulo sum via multiple access channel. When the multiple access channel satisfies a symmetric condition, the secure modulo sum capacity equals the capacity of a certain single access channel. In a general setting, we derive the lower bound of the secure modulo sum capacity. Further, we give several realistic examples by using Gaussian multiple access channel, which can be realized in wireless communication.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section II prepares notations used in this paper. Section III defines the secure modulo sum capacity, and gives two theorems, which discusses the symmetric case and the general case. Section IV gives the proof for the semi-symmetric case. Section V discusses the Gaussian multiple access channel.
II. NOTATIONS
In this section, we prepare notations and information quantities used in this paper. Given a joint distribution channel P Y,Z1,Z2 over the product system of a finite discrete set Z 1 × Z 2 and a continuous set Y, we denote the conditional probability density function of P Y |Z1,Z2 by p Y |Z1,Z2 (y|z 1 , z 2 ). Then, we define the conditional distribution P Y |Z2 over a continuous set Y conditioned in the discrete set Z 2 by the conditional probability density function p Y |Z2 (y|z 2 ) :
. Then, we define two types of the Rényi conditional
where I(Y ; Z 1 |Z 2 ) expresses the conditional mutual information. Also, we have
The concavity of the function x → x 
Given a channel P Y |Z1,Z2,Z3 from the finite discrete set Z 1 × Z 2 × Z 3 to a continuous set Y, when the random variables Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3 are generated subject to the uniform distributions, we have a joint distribution among Y, Z 1 , Z 2 . In this case, we denote the Renyi conditional mutual information and the conditional mutual information by
Further, we denote the vector (x i ) i∈I by x I . When each element x i belongs to the same vector space, we use the notation
The set {1, . . . , c} is simplified to [c].
III. SECURE MODULO SUM CAPACITY
Consider c players and Receiver. Player A i has a random variable M i ∈ F k q and broadcast it to all players. The task of Receiver is computing the modulo sum
. That is, when Receiver's information is denoted by Y ∈ Y n , we impose the following condition
for any non-empty set J [c], where M J := (M i ) i∈J . We call this task secure transmission of common reference string.
To realize this task, we employ a multiple access channel (MAC) W with c input alphabets X 1 , . . . , X c and an output alphabet Y, which might be a continuous set. Here, the i-th input alphabet X i is under the control of Player A i . That is, given element (x 1 , . . . , x c ) ∈ X 1 × . . . × X c , we have the output distribution W (x1,...,xc) on Y. When Receiver is required to compute the modulo sum of elements of F kn q with the above security condition, we employ n uses of the multiple access channel W . Here, we use the bold font like Y, x j , X j , Y J to express n symbols while the italic font like Y, x j , X j , Y J expresses single symbol. Receiver's variable Y ∈ Y n obeys the output distribution of the channel W (n) , which is defined as the distributions
The encoder is given as a set of stochastic maps Φ (n)
i,e from F kn q to X n i with i = 1, . . . , c. The decoder is given as a map Φ
and is called a code. The performance of code Φ (n) is given by the following two values. One is the decoding error probability
where the sum is taken with respect to m 1 , . . . , m c , m ′ ∈ F kn q with the condition m ′ = c j=1 m j . The other is the leaked information
for a non-empty set J [c]. The transmission rate is given as kn log q n .
When a sequence of codes {Φ (n) } satisfies the conditions
and
for a non-empty set J [c], the limit lim sup n→∞ kn log q n is called an achievable rate. The secure modulo sum capacity C SMS (W ) is defined as the supremum of achievable rates with respect to the choice of the sequence codes as well as the prime power q. Now, we assume that X i is an l-dimensional vector space over a finite field F q . Also, Y is a symmetric space for F q , i.e., for an element x ∈ F l q , there is a function f x on Y such that f x1 • f x2 = f x1+x2 . Here, the collection of functions f = (f x ) is called an action of F l q on Y. A multiple access channel W is called symmetric when the relation
holds for a measurable subset B ⊂ Y, where B f,x := {f x (y)} y∈B .
For a symmetric multiple access channel W , we define the symmetric single access channel W S as
which includes the channel (1). Theorem 1: For a symmetric multiple access channel W , we have
where C(W S ) is the channel capacity of the channel W S . Its proof is very simple. In this case, the transmission of modulo sum is the same as the information transmission under the symmetric single access channel W S . Due to the symmetric condition, the secrecy is automatically satisfied. However, it is not so easy to realize a symmetric multiple access channel W . Here, we remark the relation with the existing papers [8] , [9] , which address a similar channel. However, they consider the information leakage to the third party with respect to the modulo sum. This paper considers the information leakage to the receiver with respect to the message of each player etc.
For the general case, instead of Theorem 1, we have the following theorem. Theorem 2: Assume that X i is an l-dimensional vector space over F q as X . We prepare notations I(W ) := I(Y ; X [c] )[W ], J j := {i ∈ J |i = j}, and X J := (X i ) i∈J .
When a multiple access channel W satisfies
for J [c] and i ∈ J , we have
Under the notation I(Y ; 
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Step (1): We construct our code randomly. First, we prepare the dimension k ′ n for scramble random variables L i for i = 1, . . . , c, and choose k n and k ′ n as follows.
for J [c] and i ∈ J . Then, we randomly choose a pair of an invertible linear map
Also, we randomly choose a pair of an invertible linear map
Hence, G 1 and G 3 uniquely determine G 2 and G 4 , respectively. Additionally, we impose the universal2 condition
for x = x ′ ∈ X n and f = f ′ ∈ F kn+k ′ n q . We also randomly and independently choose the random variable E i subject to the uniform distribution on F nl−(kn+k ′ n ) q for i = 1, . . . , c. Hence, G 1 , G 3 , and E 1 , . . . , E c are priorly shared among players and Receiver. Then, we consider the following protocol. That is, using the random variable G 1 , G 3 , and E i , we define the encoder Φ (n) i,e as follows. For a given M i , Player A i randomly chooses the scramble random variable L i . That is, each player
Here, the variables G 1 , G 3 , M , L, E are assumed to be independent of each other. Then, we have the relation
Since E is subject to the uniform distribution on F
, even when the maps G 1 and G 3 are fixed, X is subject to the uniform distribution on X cn . Receiver receives the random variable Y ∈ Y n that depends only on X. That is, we have the Markov chain (G 1 , G 3 , M , L, E) − X − Y. Due to (21) , Receiver can decode M [c] and L [c] from Y by using the knowledge E [c] for the coset.
Step (2): We divide the leaked information to several parts that can be bounded. Given J ⊂ [c], we discuss the leaked information for M J := i∈J M i . For M J := (M i ) i∈J , usingJ i := {j ∈ J |j < i}, we have
where (a) follows from Eq. (35) in Appendix.
Step (3): We focus on the randomness of the choice of G 3 . Then, for s ∈ [0,
where (a) follows from Theorem 4 of [29] and (26); (b) follows from the second inequality in (6); (c) follows from (7); (d) follows from the fact that the pair (E i , F i ) and X i uniquely determine each other; and (e) follows from Appendix B. Due to Conditions (22) - (24), all the terms in (29) go to zero exponentially. Hence, we obtain Theorem 2.
Remark 1: Theorem 2 cannot be shown by simple application of the result of wire-tap channel [28] as follows. Consider the secrecy of the message M 1 of player A 1 . In this case, if other players transmit elements of X n with equal probability, the channel from player A 1 to Receiver is given as n-fold extension of the channel x → 1 q x2,...,xc W x,x2,...,xc , which enables us to directly apply the result of wire-tap channel. However, other players transmit elements of the image of G, which is a subset of X n , with equal probability. Hence, the channel from player A 1 to Receiver does not have the above simple form. Therefore, we need more careful discussion.
Remark 2: In this proof, Receiver does not use the knowledge E 1 , . . . , E c except for
Hence, there is a possibility that the transmission rate can be improved by using this knowledge.
V. GAUSSIAN CHANNEL

A. Real case
First, we consider the Gaussian multiple access channel (2) , in which Y is R and X i is F p . Using the Gaussian distribution P a with the average a and variance v on R, we have the channel as W x1,...,xc := P E(x1+...+xc) . In this case, we have
where h is the differential entropy and α(i, j) is the number of elements (x 1 , . . . , x c ) ∈ {0, . . . , p − 1} c satisfying
Here, (a) follows the discussion after Theorem 2. When p = 2 and c = 3, our lower bound is h(
), which is numerically calculated as Fig. 2 . When E goes to infinity, the distributions {P iE } c(p−1) i=0 can be distinguished so that I(W ) goes to log p and The base of logarithm is chosen to be e. The horizontal axis expresses the power E. The vertical axis expresses our lower bond h(
)+h(
) This lower bound approaches 1 2 log 2 and is positive with E ≥ 2.1715.
B. Complex case
Next, we consider the case when Y is C, and discuss the case with X i = F 7 as a typical case [15] , [17] . Let P a be the Gaussian distribution with the average a and variance v on C. We define the map u from F 7 to C as follows.
Then, we define W x1,...,xc := P (u(x1)+...+u(xc))E . Hence, we have (31). Due to the same reason as the above case, when E goes to infinity, I(W ) goes to 
VI. CONCLUSION
To discuss the generation of common reference string via a multiple access channel, we have introduced the secure modulo sum capacity for a multiple access channel. We have shown that the secure modulo sum capacity equals the channel capacity when the multiple access channel satisfies the symmetric condition. Since the symmetric condition does not hold in a natural setting, we have derived a lower bound for the secure modulo sum capacity in a general setting. We have examined this lower bound under the real and complex Gaussian multiple access channels with numerical analysis. 
In particular, when I(B; C|D) = 0, we have
(37) and (38), for s ∈ [0, 1 2 ], we have the following relations, where the explanations for steps is explained later. 
